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Abstract 
Though the central government uses neither a transfer nor a regional allocation policy, it can affect the distribution of 
the population. This paper analyzes the optimal government policy and examines whether or not the government 
should take into account agglomeration without a regional redistribution policy. The optimal size of central government 
depends on the degree of increasing returns in the private and the public sector. When the central government shows a 
much lower degree of increasing returns in contrast to the private sector, it should decrease the provision of the public 
good. As a result, the central government limits agglomeration. If the central government does not consider its effect 
on agglomeration, it is too large in size, and it causes too much agglomeration.
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     1. Introduction
The public sector aﬀects the population distribution and the agglomeration of the pop-
ulation. Roos (2004) shows that the competition of local governments restrains agglom-
eration. Burbidge and Myers (1994) utilize the local government’s transfer policy to
control migration. Moreover, the national or central government may lead to agglomera-
tion. Riou (2006) analyzes the transfer policy to oﬀset agglomeration. When the central
government uses neither a transfer nor a regional allocation policy, should it consider the
distribution of the population?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the size of government when its scale aﬀects
the agglomeration of the population. Pirttil¨ a and Tuomala (2005) analyze the size of
the public sector when the government uses public production as a redistribution policy.
But they do not examine regional agglomeration. Dascher (2002), without examining the
optimal policy of the government, considers that the government aﬀects the distribution
of the population through the labor market. Following Dascher’s model, this paper
analyzes the optimal size of government. In this optimal policy, I examine whether or not
the government should take into account agglomeration without a regional redistribution
policy.
2. The model
The economy is composed of regions 1 and 2. In each region, one kind of consumption
good is produced under conditions of perfect competition. This economy has two kinds
of consumption goods. These goods can be traded across regions and are produced from
intermediate goods that can not be traded across regions. The total population in the
economy is ¯ L = L1 + L2 , where Li is the population of a region i (i = 1;2) . Each
individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Individuals can migrate among regions
without cost.
The central government provides public goods that can be consumed by all individuals
in the economy. This pure public good yields the same eﬀect across both regions. The
1government locates in one region to produce the public good by using intermediate goods
in that region. To supply the public good, the government collects an income tax from
all individuals. The tax rate is uniformly applicable across individuals. The government
does not use transfers to reduce regional inequality. In the following, I assume that the
central government is located in region 1.










j is the amount of consumption goods j(j=1,2), and G is the public good provided
by the government. In this economy, individuals can consume the public good wherever
they locate. Since each individual supplies one unit of labor, that individual’s income is





2 = (1 ¡ t)wi
where Pj(j = 1;2) is the price of consumption goods, wi is region i’s labor wage, and t is
the government’s tax rate that is equal in both regions. Individuals are free to migrate
to the region where the utility is higher. Therefore, in an equilibrium, the utility is equal
across regions.
The consumption good i is produced only in region i(i=1,2) with intermediate goods








; 0 < ½ < 1 (1)
where qn is the intermediate good n , Ni is the number of intermediate goods produced
in region i. ½ is the parameter of substitution. This production function provides in-
creasing returns to scale, and the degree of increasing returns is higher when ½ is smaller.
Using the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization, aggregate private demand of the































½ is a price index.
The intermediate goods sector has the structure of monopolistic competition. In this
sector, each good is produced by a single producer. Each producer uses labor as the
input. The amount of labor input to produce qk units of the intermediate good k is
Lqk = f + bqk (k 2 [0;Ni])
where f is the ﬁxed labor input and b is the marginal labor input. Each producer acts
as a monopolist. The producer faces the private demand for the intermediate good (2)
and takes as given the price index Bi and the total amount of the consumption good
i Xi . Moreover, for simplifying the analysis, I assume that the producer operates as
if the government’s demand is zero. When this assumption is relaxed, the equilibrium
populations of each region do not change if the tax rate is constant. With regard to
government behavior, though the optimal tax rate changes, the main results of the study
remain unchanged.
Following Dascher (2002), the central government produces the public good G in re-
gion 1. In its production of the public good, the government uses intermediate goods.
Because intermediate goods are not tradable across regions, only region 1 supplies inter-
mediate goods that are used by the government. The production function of the public









; 0 < ¿ < 1 (3)
where gn is the amount of the government’s intermediate good n input. ¿ is the parameter
of substitution. Like the consumption good, the production function of the public good
yields increasing returns to scale. Since the government collects income tax to cover the
cost of public good production, the government’s budget constraint is written:
Z N1
0
pngndn = t(w1L1 + w2L2) (4)
From this model, when the tax rate is constant, the equilibrium populations of regions









(5) and (6) show that the presence of the government causes agglomeration. To produce
intermediate goods for the government, region 1 needs a larger labor force. Moreover,
except for the public sector, each region is symmetric. If the government did not exist,
the population would be equally distributed between regions and no agglomeration would
arise. Thus, the equilibrium population in region 1 is larger than that in region 2.
The government maximizes individual utility because it is equalized in the equilib-
rium. To analyze the government behavior, I derive the indirect utility function when
the tax rate is constant. The indirect utility function of the individual in region i is given
as
V













If the government does not take into account the inﬂuence of its action on the distribution
of the population and the market equilibrium, the objective function is (7).
If the government takes into account the eﬀect of its behavior on the distribution
of the population, the government’s objective function is diﬀerent. In that case, the
objective function (7) is rewritten as follows:
V
i = t(1 ¡ t)
1+½






















The government maximizes the utility (8) when it knows the eﬀect on the population.
3. Agglomeration and government size
This section shows the regional distribution of the population when the central govern-
ment behaves so as to maximize social welfare. In order to analyze whether or not the
government should consider the agglomeration, I ﬁrst explain the optimal case in which
4the government perceives the inﬂuence of its action on the population. Next, I show the
case in which the government does not take that eﬀect into account. I then compare the
regional distributions of the population in each case.
First, I explain the optimal case where the government considers the eﬀect of its
behavior on the population and the market equilibrium. The government maximizes the
individual utility (8) with the use of the tax rate as a policy instrument. To solve the




















Next, I analyze the case in which the government neglects its inﬂuence on the popu-
lation and the market equilibrium. In that case, the government chooses the tax rate t
in order to maximize the individual utility expressed by (7) where the government takes






In the case of neglect, the government chooses the tax rate tn = 1=2 and the popu-
lations of each region are determined by (5) and (6) . I compare region 1’s population
to the optimal case. Among these populations, if the optimal tax rate t¤ is put over tn,
region 1 has a smaller population than the optimal case, but if t¤ is put below tn, the
population of region 1 is larger.
(9) shows that t¤ is determined by ¿ and ½ . If ¿ is equal to ½ , then t¤ = tn = 1=2. This
implies that if the public and private sectors have the same production technology, the
tax rate is 1=2 regardless of whether or not the government considers its eﬀect on market
equilibrium. Then, the populations of each region are not changed by the government
behavior. These results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 If the degree of increasing returns to scale in public
sector production is equal to that in private sector production (¿ = ½) , the
central government need not take account of its eﬀect on the population.
5When the production of public goods increases more than the production of consump-
tion goods in the case of expanding the number of intermediate goods, ¿ is smaller than
½ . Then the tax rate t¤ is greater than 1=2 = tn . When the production of consumption
goods increases more than the production of public goods (¿ > ½) , the tax rate t¤ is
smaller than 1=2 = tn . These results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 Assume that ¿ < ½ (¿ > ½) . If the central government
ignores its eﬀect on the population, the government chooses the lower (higher)
tax rate in contrast to the optimal case. Then, the government causes too
little (much) agglomeration.
The above proposition indicates that the government should decrease the extent of
agglomeration when it has a lower degree of increasing returns in contrast to the private
sector. In the optimal policy, the government with a lower level of productivity attempts
to decrease public goods because the production of such goods yields less beneﬁt than that
of private goods. The government then sets a lower tax rate. With a smaller government,
the region in which the government is located has a smaller demand for labor, thus
restraining agglomeration. In that case, the government without a regional redistribution
policy limits the regional inequality of the population. If the central government does
not consider its eﬀect on the population, such behavior does not arise. As a consequence,
too much agglomeration arises in contrast to the optimal case.
To determine the optimal size of the government, I should compare the production
function of the public and private sectors. Previous studies estimate that the private
sector performs more eﬃciently than the public sector when they produce the same
good. For example, Christoﬀersen, Paldam and W¨ urtz (2007) examine the cleaning of
Danish schools and conclude that the private sector reduces the cost compared to the
public sector because the private sector utilizes economies of scale more eﬃciently. In this
paper, when the private goods are similar to the public goods, these results mean that
the degree of increasing returns to scale in the public sector production is lower than
in private sector production (¿ > ½) . Then, the government should decrease its size
6to increase the private sector and restrain the regional inequality of population. If the
central government does not consider its eﬀect on the population, it is too large in size,
and it causes too much agglomeration. Even if the government uses neither the transfer
nor the regional allocation policy, it should consider its eﬀect on the agglomeration.
4. Conclusion
This paper analyzed whether or not the government should take into account agglomer-
ation without a regional redistribution policy. If the degree of increasing returns to scale
in public sector production is equal to that in private sector production, the central gov-
ernment need not take account of its eﬀect on the population. But when the government
has a lower degree of increasing returns in contrast to the private sector, it should take
into account agglomeration. If the central government does not consider its eﬀect on the
population, its size is too large and it causes too much agglomeration.
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